R.C.: It was the very end of the 1960s. By 1969 or 1970, I was making videos, and my career as a video artist lasted approximately from 1970 to 1990, the '70s being primarily a period of production and the '80s of exhibition. Two works in particular, Doubt (1975) and Ideology (1978) , were shown at museums, including the Whitney and MoMA, as well as alternative spaces and university galleries in the US and in Europe. B.B.: I would love to see them. Did you know Dan Graham at the time? R.C.: I knew pretty much everybody. The art world was very small then. B.B.: Is that also when you got to know Richard Serra and Joan Jonas? R.C.: Yes, these were all people that we invited to do seminars at the program. B.B.: What about Fluxus? It was a very radical movement in New York, but it didn't really seem to touch you. You bypassed it, so to speak. R.C.: Not exactly. In addition to Carlotta introducing us to video technology, encouraging that kind of work, and then showing it at the Kitchen, her partner, Jamie Dearing, a painter who was Don Judd's assistant, was also important for me. For a long time, he and Carlotta were my two closest friends, together with the writer Constance DeJong. They are responsible for me having seen anything at all during that period; they were very much engaged with everything happening in New York, not only exhibitions but performances, screenings, lectures, all sorts of things, and they would make sure I went along. That was my introduction. So yes, of course, I remember visiting George Maciunas's studio on Wooster Street early on. He had a basement exhibition space, as I recall. Carlotta and Jamie were actually closer with people like Dan Graham and Gordon Matta-Clark-lots of people I got to know a little. I wouldn't say they were friends, but I knew them. And we invited many of them-not Maciunasto do seminars regularly throughout the '70s. B.B.: When the program started officially in 1968, you ran it with David Hupert, correct? R.C.: That's right. And the division was quite clear-David was in charge of the museum-studies program. I want to give David credit here, because he invented two institutional frameworks. He brought in students to curate exhibitions for a system of branch museums that David established around New York-that was his other great invention. B.B.: Did he have a populist motivation? Were the branches intended to make the museum more accessible to different populations? R.C.: Possibly. They were never outside of Manhattan, and they were all housed in corporate buildings and paid for by powerful corporations like Philip Morris. B.B.: Which is one of the contradictions, of course. Who were the first faculty you hired? R.C.: Yvonne Rainer and David Diao. Diao was a great resource because he knew everybody in the art world and everybody knew him. They were very present throughout the 1970s and into the early '80s. David gave us access to artists . . . B.B.: In the painting world, so to speak?
On the Whitney Independent Study Program 9 studio-visit seminars, which I hated, because you couldn't have a proper conversation. So eventually I outlawed them. But we would try, because it seemed like a thing to do, to visit artists in their lair and get them talking about their work. B.B.: Do you remember which ones you visited other than Warhol? R.C.: Don Judd, Brice Marden, Frank Stella, and Nancy Graves. All of the artists known in Minimalist, Conceptualist, post-Minimalist groups. Also independent filmmakers like Michael Snow. B.B.: Did you know Hollis Frampton? R.C.: He did seminars for us, yes. And color-field painters, quite a few of whom were Diao's friends. And through Yvonne's association with the dance world we invited many dancers and choreographers to lead seminars, including Trisha Brown, Simone Forti, Lucinda Childs, Joan Jonas, and others. B.B.: But by this time you were already shifting into theory and media, right? R.C.: Certainly by the mid-'70s my interests were much more on the theoretical side . . . B.B.: And the media side. R.C.: Yes, film and cinema. Around this time we established an informal reading group in the program. The students wanted to discuss various kinds of critical theory, and so I made myself available. Because the reading group was a bit haphazard, I introduced what became known as the theory seminar in 1981. Until this point, we had weekly seminars but always with a guest leader-an artist, critic, or art historian. That continued once a week, and the theory seminar was an addition. I decided to put to pedagogical use the kind of theory that I had been studying throughout the '70s. This included, on the one hand, structuralist semiotics and poststructuralist theoryDerrida was very important to me and to a lot of people at the time-and, on the other hand, Marxist theory, carrying on the interest in the Frankfurt School as well as more recent work deriving from Gramsci and Althusser. B.B.: Do you remember the first text that you assigned for the reading seminar? R.C.: Yes. I have the syllabus here somewhere. I had the whole year laid out, and beyond structuralism, poststructuralism, and Marxism there was feminism and psychoanalysis. To answer your question, the first theoretical text we ever read was Laura Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." B.B.: The only people who "suffered" from this seminar were the artists who said, "Once you've gone to the Whitney program, you don't want to paint anymore."
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Hal Foster, Sarah Bayliss, and Ron Clark at the ISP space at 384 Broadway, circa 1992. R.C.: This couldn't be more wrong! B.B.: But you know that's the reputation. R.C.: Well, I'm not responsible for what people say, but it is utterly wrong. The artists were as interested, if not more so in many cases, as the art historians or cultural critics in the program. So we can lay that particular myth to rest once and for all. In any case, for the first few years, participation in the reading seminars was not required. B.B.: That's hard to believe. R.C.: Most of the students participated actively, and if they didn't, that was finefrankly, I was quite happy with that. They were there because they wanted to be there, not because they were getting a grade. That changed somewhat in the late '80s. Both David and Yvonne transitioned to teaching part-time, which allowed me to bring in Mary Kelly, who had been involved with the program as one of our visiting faculty. I had also instituted in the early '80s a series of what we still call "visiting faculty": artists and critics who lead seminars and meet individually with students. In the 1980s, artists included Mary, Barbara Kruger (who was always a good friend to this program), Martha Rosler, Silvia Kolbowski, and the critics included Hal Foster, Craig Owens, and you. When Mary and Hal joined the faculty, things changed a bit. They wanted the theory seminar to be 14 OCTOBER Karen Jones, Benjamin Buchloh, and Christel Hollevoet at the curatorial-studies exhibition, 1991. required, more structured, more like a proper academic course. And it's been a required part of the program ever since. By the end of the '80s, there were no longer two parts to the program but three. It became clear that the museum-studies program was really two programs that were forced together. Clearly, there were participants who wanted to be involved in curatorial studies, and then there were art historians and cultural critics who were much more interested in the history and theory side, and so we split the museum-studies program into two programs-curatorial studies and critical studies. B.B.: When did the tripartite organization happen? R.C.: Around 1987. But before then I needed someone with the proper training to lead the curatorial program. The first person I brought in was Richard Armstrong, who is now the director of the Guggenheim Museum. Richard was with us for five years in the first half of the '80s. B.B.: While being a curator at the Whitney? R.C.: Tom Armstrong made him a curator once he got to know Richard; he had great respect for Richard. B.B.: Richard started at the program before becoming a curator at the museum? R.C.: That's right. Eventually Richard left the program to become a full-time cura-
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Jonathan Crary leading a seminar at the ISP space at 384 Broadway, 1993. tor at the museum. That's when I hired Hal, and he had the job for about four years. B.B.: Before he went to Cornell. R.C.: Yes. Then when Hal left, I turned to you in 1991. I remember clearly because 1991-92 was a real crisis year for the program. It was a struggle between the ISP and the new administration after Tom Armstrong left. This lasted for quite some time, through most of the '90s. You were with us only for two years, but I still think of the exhibitions that the curatorial students produced under your guidance as a model for alternative curatorial practice.
I'm thinking of shows like Power of the City, Dirt and Domesticity, Abject Art, and The Subject of Rape. I want to emphasize the essential roles that both you and Hal have brought and continue to bring to the ISP as visiting faculty. The two of you have provided an art-historical dimension to the intellectual content of the program that would not otherwise be present. This art-historical dimension has also been brought to the program since the late 1990s by Alex Alberro, who has provided advice and guidance especially to our critical-studies students.
Also, coming out of the '80s and into the '90s, the role of our visiting faculty became much more important. Part of this was financial: Pressure was Frazier and Emily Jacir. Of course, Yvonne has continued to be a part of the program. The one you might consider a bit odd is my long commitment to the work of Vito Acconci. For many years, Vito led off our seminar series. He was a brilliant and important artist who very early on took up questions of subjectivity, the effects of the unconscious, and sexuality. Does he figure in your lexicon? B.B.: Yes, he always has, partially through Dan Graham, who told me in the early '70s how crucial Vito was for his own development as an artist. R.C.: Concerning Duchamp, the more important figure for me is Bertolt Brecht.
It's possible to see two different tendencies within the historical avantgardes of the interwar period, moving in two different directions. The OCTOBERBrechtian project, which had a close affiliation with the Soviet avant-gardes, particularly Constructivism and Productivism, is quite distinct from the Duchampian project. B.B.: There are other schisms as well. When one goes into the theoretical trajectory of the program, on the one hand, it is systemically Brechtian in many of its approaches. At the same time, it is also explicitly Frankfurt School in many of its reading assignments. And then thirdly, it is oriented to Barthes and postBarthesian semiology. Barthes began as a Brechtian, but he did not remain so, and the program tries to trace that shift. But can you remain a Brechtian and be a structuralist or a semiologist after the late '70s? Althusser is one answer to that question, but not on the level of cultural production. R.C.: I don't know how much we can separate theory and practice; they're very much imbricated. I would narrate it differently. For me the crucial shiftalready beginning in the mid-to-late '70s but certainly by the early '80s-was my encounter with British cultural theory and increasingly the work of Stuart Hall. That's a very different kind of theoretical project. As you know, it differs substantially from Frankfurt School Marxism. It isn't entirely Althusserian either. Hall had a very developed critique of Althusser even though he took on many of Althusser's theoretical tools. The shift is away from notions of production in the Soviet or Benjaminian sense toward questions of ideology, representation, and epistemology. From the point of view of critical cultural studies, the great question is: What is the ideological role of culture? I'd include art, of course, and also ask: How does culture fulfill this role? In the classical Althusserian sense, the answer is about the reproduction of social relations, of the social relations of capitalist class society. Of course, it's far more complicated. B.B.: Even in Althusser it is far more complicated, because he explicitly states that aesthetic practice is one of the few domains in the production of representation that does not completely succumb to ideology. He says that about mathematics too. R.C.: That's complicated as well. Althusser is an immensely important thinker and hugely influential to this day. My point is that ideology takes on a different meaning within British cultural theory. It's not so much about the "dominant ideology," though that's still a useful term in some contexts. It's the question of how we as members of a society make that society intelligible to ourselves through different levels of meaning-of signification, representation, and knowledge, or what Hall calls "definitions of reality"-how we come to understand the world. This is the Gramscian side of British cultural studies. For Hall, Gramsci is much more important than Althusser-Gramsci's question of how we know our relationship to the social world. There are different kinds of epistemological theory within the history of philosophy. The one that Hall adhered to, and I adhere to, comes from philosophical realism. Brecht was a realist, and when he called himself a realist, it was in that philosophical sense. All philosophical realisms begin with the idea that there is a real world beyond thought and language. Something is being thought about and known, and for me that is social reality, structures of social relationship. This was central to Hall's way of thinking, and he was very involved in the mass media, especially the news media. It is one thing to say that there are events in the world and that the only way we have access to them is through thinking and language, that they don't contain their own meaning ontologically but that we construct meaning for them. But then, from a Marxist point of view, the question becomes, If there are different accounts constructed around events-a trade-union struggle, say-why is it that certain accounts get selected out and routinely and systematically produced around these events? How is it that those constructions come to be understood as the only valid and true ones? This is where, from a realist point of view, the argument shifts. And one has to argue that there is a connection, a deep structural and ontological connection, between reality and representation, between sign and referent. I know that this is heresy to many poststructuralists, but we need to begin with this idea that there is a connection, a causal relationship at a deep structural level-this is what a philosophical-realist epistemology argues. The work I'm referring toand this was Hall's reference point, as it was for many British social thinkers at the time-is the writings of the British philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar is the one who made these arguments, primarily in the field of science, and he was very much on the left. Bhaskar made a case to restore the emphasis on ontology. For structuralism and poststructuralism there was a shift to epistemology, which was good, except that it abandoned ontology altogether. So what some people have been trying to do since then, from a realist perspective, is to restore the balance-to insist that there should be a dialectical relationship between epistemology and ontology. You need them both. B.B.: That's why I'm surprised whenever you make a disparaging remark to me about Hannah Arendt, because isn't that partially what she was doing? R.C.: I have other complaints against Arendt. She is very much a Heideggerian. B.B.: But Heidegger is the philosopher of ontology. R.C.: He is, but, as Adorno said, it's a bad ontology. It isn't just that Heidegger was a Nazi. His theory of ontology was faulty. What Adorno meant was that it was not materialist, not realist; it was something else, about authentic essences of being. B.B.: Can one transfer this imperative to artistic practices? Can one argue that they should be both ontological and semiological-or does it become almost impossible to maintain that claim? R.C.: Certain dominant forms of poststructuralist and postmodernist theory move away from ontology, away from an understanding of knowledge or truth or reality claims or even historical claims. It ends up in an absolute relativism, OCTOBER 20 which is why people like Hall worried that that's where this kind of theory leads you, unless you bring it up sharply against a Marxist, materialist emphasis on the constructedness of things. B.B.: Who, then, would be an example of "postmodernism" in the artistic sphere?
Where do you see the devastating consequences of such an attitude? You might not want to mention names. R.C.: I don't mind mentioning names; it's just that there are so many. As you know, Raymond Williams has always been a very important reference for me, and I find some of his thinking very relevant to the problems that we encounter in the art field. this from the present, living under Trump and under proto-fascist conditions, at a time of a deep crisis of legitimacy and credibility in cultural production and cultural institutions alike. And prompted by people like Andrea Fraser and Yates McKee, both whom came out of the program, we start to reflect on the role that museums, and museum trustees in particular, play in maintaining dominance and ideology against the interests of cultural production. R.C.: Sure, those trustees are part of the dominant culture. B.B.: But the chasm between these two spheres-between critical cultural production and actual institutional reception-has become greater than ever. And assuming that you can work in a pocket of alternate models has become more precarious than ever as well. R.C.: I expected that would be your argument. You do tend toward totalizing arguments.
B.B.: Is that what this is? R.C.: Thinking in a totalizing way can help us understand how the capitalist system
On the Whitney Independent Study Programfalls into crisis, as with the 2008 financial crisis, which was devastating for millions of ordinary working people. A trillion dollars' worth of value was lost, with mortgages, foreclosures, credit-card loans-the debt trap that people were sucked into with easy money since the 1990s. Marxists love crises; that is part of a materialist understanding of historical process, of these great breaks and discontinuities. But neoliberals love crises as well. Milton Friedman was a great advocate of crises, because he thought they created opportunities for further capital expansion, especially in the financial sphere, and profit-tak- it was part of their official policy: They abandoned the working class in favor of identity politics. They said, "The working class doesn't matter; either they don't vote or we don't care what they think, and we're going to go for the different identity categories and make our politics around them." B.B.: When was the Democratic Party in America last committed to the working class? R.C.: Probably up until Bill Clinton, even though in his mind Clinton was very much on the side of the workers. When he got into office, his advisors showed him how the economy worked under neoliberalism, and he's quoted as saying, "You mean all of these social policies that I want to bring in I can't do because of a handful of fucking financiers on Wall Street?" B.B.: Just to provoke this further, there's a tendency, typical of Marxist thinking, to idealize the working class as an agent of history, and that's still apparent in your saying the Democratic Party has betrayed the working class, as though it were still an agent of history in the 1980s and '90s in the US and in Europe. Social-democratic parties are falling apart because they don't understand that the working class has been destroyed by fifty years of consumption. David would want to do. I was talking about the 2016 election and the published fact that the leaders of the Democratic Party did not emphasize working-class votes. It was a voting strategy, and one that almost worked for them, but it would've been a tragedy had it done so. B.B.: Why would it have been a tragedy if it worked? R.C.: The idea that the working class either doesn't exist or has been so transformed by capitalism that it's not an effective force in society-I disagree with that utterly. The old industrial working class of factory workers was always a very small portion of the population. There are many forms of the working class today in the advanced capitalist countries that have been theorized in terms of post-Fordist kinds of labor. What constitutes productive work has changed within capitalism. But, of course, there is still an industrial working class; it just isn't here. It's in Mexico, in Malaysia, it's all over the place, and it needs trade-union militancy; it needs organizing. And that's happening: They're doing it themselves. Your view is a narrow one. Frankly, it's a liberal argument. That kind of thinking about the proletariat has more to do with Proudhon than Marx. It comes from anarcho-syndicalism, from a whole tradition of trade unionism and populist movements among working people. It's not a category that's really crucial for the Marxist analysis of how capital works. That has much more to do with how labor power is exploited and how value is produced, and how surplus value is produced out of value and capital out of surplus value. Even though productive labor has been transformed completely since World War II, there is still value being produced in people's working activity. That's the Marxist argument and that's my argument. If you disagree, you're going to have to tell me where the value is coming from. Capitalists argue that it comes from capital, that entrepreneurs generate value-"wealth producers," as Thatcher used to say.
OCTOBER
That's a very faulty argument, and most economists probably wouldn't adhere to it. For the neoliberals, of course, it's in finance. It's all about speculation-wild, crazy speculation-and the potential value of "financial instruments," many of which are forms of what Marx called "fictitious capital." B.B.: This brings us back to the connection to the art world, of which we are, in different ways, an integral part . . . R.C.: Come on, we're clinging to the fringes! B.B.: Under neoliberal conditions the art world has been transformed so dramatically in the last fifteen years that the claim that the Whitney Independent Study Program is a space of alternate forms of production and critique, that it is utterly disconnected from the larger sphere of consumption of art, has become more and more precarious, right? It's become very difficult to maintain that independence. R.C.: You're taking the gloves off here, and I thought we were having a polite conversation! Of course, you can say that. I'm sure lots of people think that. I don't think that myself. B.B.: The space is not as protected as it used to be, nor as autonomous as it seemed. We have to confront that. R.C.: No, that's wrong. The only proof we need is that the dominant culture, including the dominant academic culture, still doesn't like Marxism, and it's grown not to like psychoanalysis. It probably has its doubts about structuralism too. The endless disparaging of Marxism is all the proof we need; it hasn't been incorporated by the dominant ideological discourse. B.B.: I wasn't talking about discourse. I was talking about artistic productionwhat is happening in the world of the museum and the market and the extraordinary shifting of surplus value into the art world. R.C.: Yes, financial capital and speculative activity certainly. Since the late '90s, not only is the art market a part of the larger system of finance capital but a major sector, somewhere around twenty percent. The superrich have run out of other places to put their money. They're also putting their money into new luxury high-rises, which are unoccupied for the most part. These are forms of speculation, and, sadly, art has become one too, a kind of investment property. B.B.: Does that affect your sense of working in a sphere of relative autonomy? R.C.: There's an even greater urgency to develop the critical analysis of how the system works. There has been a great historical shift within capitalism away from Keynesian economics and away from the social-welfare state.
Historically, that's a relatively recent development that we still need to theorize more fully. We need to understand, from a Marxist point of view, that no cultural form, no art practice, is innocent or neutral; it's always in some way bound up with social interests and relations of power. Another way to answer your question is by thinking through the relationship between the projects of Brecht and Hall. Brecht was at the begin-ning of a tradition of work concerned with what Hall called "the politics of representation." Cultural forms produce forms of intelligibility for social events in the world; the cultural field thus contains different and competing versions of reality. It is a field of struggle over how the social world is signified, how different social interests are represented. For me, artistic practice is primarily a question of ideological struggle, the politics of representation. B.B.: A concern for the politics of representation and a preoccupation with an imaginary aesthetic autonomy don't exclude each other, do they? R.C.: No, of course not. In the early 1970s, Raymond Williams inaugurated a shift in terminology. Up until that point, he argued, most criticism (he was talking about literary criticism) looked at objects in order to break them down into their components, which were then analyzed in turn. What we need, Williams insisted, is a new method, a new approach, to look at practices and their conditions. It's a stark change, a shift in perspective, analysis, and political calculation alike. And the conditions he had in mind ranged from local institutions within the cultural field to a wide array of institutions of class society.
Williams was also concerned with what he called "conventions," meaning the forms that are already available when writers and artists start to work. You are situated within an institution, a structure of social, economic, and political relationships, but you also have a whole set of forms, conventions, signifying practices from the history of cultural production that you can take up. Any artist will tell you that. They're not inventing anything from scratch; it's already there-a great field of forms to choose from and make work that, hopefully, is a bit different.
Those are the conditions of a practice from Williams's point of view. I've always found that immensely important, and to this day, after all these years, I still have the students read that particular essay, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," which is an argument against the base/superstructure metaphor in favor of a concept of totality and of hegemony. I tell them we're going to be looking at two critical cultural-studies approaches, two principal methodological forms: the theory of ideology and the theory of hegemony. Certainly from a Marxist point of view you never want to lose that emphasis on determinacy, or the emphasis on dominance-that there are always relations of power within which cultural forms are produced, and that they can't help but be affected by such conditions. That's a fully social account of culture.
In the essay, Williams also says that the usual question is, What is the relationship of art or culture to society? For him, that's the wrong question because in any society you're going to have cultural forms-art, literature, whatever-that are always already present. We could also associate this emphasis with Althusser, who talks about "conditions of existence." Any social formation is made up of different practices and different levels of practice, primarily economic, political, ideological, and cultural, and each is the condition of possibility of the other. You can't have the economic without the political, cultural, and ideological, nor can you have the cultural without the economic, political, and ideological. They're always in a relation of overdetermination-that's what the term means in Althusser. It's this kind of inter-determining set of relationships in any social formation that you have to consider when you are looking at a particular practice within a particular domain. If you want to know what's determining it-what's shaping, constructing, limiting, constraining it-then you need to look at its conditions of existence. I think that's a perfectly legitimate argument and explains a lot, but it is a very different notion of determination. Overdetermination withdraws from any kind of hard determinism. Do you think people apply to the ISP because the program stands for Marxist critique and theories? Do you search out people who are not qualified for that type of formation? This is a question about expanding the selection criteria, expanding the eligibility of people who come into the program. Because by now the program might appear like an elite university program, so difficult and challenging and complicated for people to compete in and comply with that obviously only a few people will ultimately get in. Do you think about those criteria, in terms of admission? What about in terms of race, which is something that most institutions still fail to address adequately? R.C.: If you're talking about what I have sought to construct as a core set of theoretical and critical ideas, arguments, and categories, which for shorthand I refer to as a critical cultural-studies approach (with a great debt to people like Hall), then yes-that's part of what people come here for. I'm not going to stop providing that. If you're asking, Are there changes? Of course. There's always both continuity and change. We try to strike a balance, to continue to do what we have always done successfully, but at the same time to adjust, because reality changes. And the ways in which we theorize reality have to develop and change as well. B.B.: The relationship of artistic production to the art world and of museums to politics has also changed dramatically over the last ten years, and it has affected us all in various ways. The setup that you propose, the strategies of institutional critique, for example, that I am aware of and would like to continue to believe in, is that we are constructing spaces of alternative forms of thinking, of making and receiving artistic and cultural production, in opposition to mainstream hegemonic forms. Yet those mainstream institutions have changed to such an extent that many don't care at all any longer what contestation we confront them with.
fight, and it's one that I'm happy to take on. We need to restore some notion of truth and some kind of philosophical realism, as well as a dialectical approach that would restore the relationship between epistemology and ontology. This is why I'm so interested in this kind of theory and why I feel a certain responsibility to continue to provide it. This year I have a couple of very bright students who are deeply engaged with these questions, which makes me very happy. They're taking it very seriously, doing the reading and studying, and they're artists.
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The blackboard with seminar schedule, circa 2005.
